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LEARNING (AND TEACHING) FROM DOING
Edward B. Foley*
I. A MENTORING OPPORTUNITY
Even more special than the opportunity to argue at the
Supreme Court is the opportunity to serve as a mentor to junior
attorneys while doing so. My background as a law professor
sensitized me to the possibility of playing this mentoring role,
but the opportunity was made concrete by the litigation team we
assembled to prepare for the oral argument.
Serving as State Solicitor of Ohio while on leave from the
University, I was fortunate to have the help of two Assistant
Solicitors, David Gormley and Stephen Carney. But these were
two experienced appellate litigators, who needed no mentoring
and who, indeed, could teach me a thing or two. Their duties on
the case were at a higher level. Having had the hands-on
responsibility for drafting the briefs, their role in argument prep
was mostly strategic and conceptual: what sort of questions we
might expect from the Court and how best to handle them.
The task of tracking down answers to a myriad of research
questions fell to two first-year attorneys in our office, Dave
Patton and Andy Bowers, who had just finished law school at
Ohio State, where I was a professor. Naturally, then, I felt a
special affinity for these eager young lawyers, especially as they
exhibited a model can-do attitude, willing to share my
philosophy of "no stone should be left unturned" as we
prepared for argument. The bond we developed quickly felt
similar to the bond that sometimes develops between research
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assistants and a professor, and so I began to see our shared
preparation experience as a kind of teaching opportunity.
II. A LESSON ABOUT THE VALUE OF HARD WORK
In getting ready for the argument, there was a surprising
amount of research for Dave and Andy to do. Surprising,
especially to them as junior attorneys, because our team had
already sent four briefs to the Supreme Court (petition, petition-
stage reply, merits brief, and merits-stage reply), not to mention
all our office's briefing of the case in the district court and court
of appeals. What more basic legal research could there possibly
be left to do, simply to get ready for an oral argument?
Habeas cases generally are procedurally complex, and ours
was particularly so. A number of procedural wrinkles we had
been able to confine to footnotes in our briefs. But now they
loomed large, as potentially unanswered issues or obstacles,
should the Court be interested in exploring them at oral
argument. We were even concerned that the Court might choose
to "DIG" the case (i.e., Dismiss it as Improvidently Granted), if
it found some of the procedural problems intractable. As we
were preparing for oral argument, we felt like we were tiptoeing
through a procedural minefield, with each twist and turn
presenting a new research question for Dave or Andy to address.
Indeed, in his own article about this experience (written for
an Ohio State alumni publication), Dave wrote: "The most
striking aspect of the whole experience was the staggering
amount of preparation."' While our need for additional research
at this late stage of the process might have been unusually large,
the fact that argument preparation generally takes substantial
time and effort even after completion of briefing is a common
phenomenon in my experience. As David Frederick has
commented in his superb new book, Supreme Court and
Appellate Advocacy:
An advocate should spend time conducting legal research
between the filing of briefs and the oral argument.
Sometimes that research runs to ground issues intentionally
1. David Villar Patton, New Attorneys Get First Glimpse of Argument Before the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Ohio St. Univ. L. Record 38 (Summer/Fall 2000).
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left open in the brief; sometimes to close holes that did not
seem so wide or significant when writing the brief but now
seem much more significant.2
Thus, in my role as mentor to Dave and Andy, my first order of
business was to have them experience the reality of what
General William Suter, the Clerk of the Court, has advised:
"[T]here are three secrets for arguing well in the Supreme
Court: preparation, preparation, and still more preparation." 3
Given Dave's observation to his fellow alums about the
"staggering" amount of preparation that we undertook, I would
say: "Lesson learned."
III. A LESSON ABOUT REFINING THE ARGUMENT
I confess that even I was surprised how unprepared I truly
was when I stepped to the podium for my first moot court. Even
if there were some procedural loose ends to pin down, I still
thought that I knew the essence of my case. Oh, was I wrong.
Fortunately, serving as one of the justices at my first moot
was Jeffrey Sutton, my predecessor as State Solicitor, a graduate
of Ohio State's law school, and now a well-deserved nominee to
the Sixth Circuit. His first question at the moot was very simple,
but it exposed the big weakness in my preparation up to that
point. "What's the big deal here?" he asked, meaning why-in
terms of basic equity-should the State win its argument that the
habeas petitioner should be denied the right to bring his
constitutional claim in federal court when his lawyer missed a
state-court deadline?
I didn't have a good answer, even though I had worked
really hard on framing the question presented for the cert
petition, getting it precisely worded (both in terms of the
national importance of the issue and the conflict among the
circuits). We even revisited the wording of our question
(although we decided to keep it) when, in his merits-stage brief,
Respondent challenged whether the question was properly
2. David C. Frederick, Supreme Court and Appellate Advocacy: Mastering Oral
Argument 243 (West 2002); see also id. at 53 (noting that "a brief writer can 'write
around' problems that simply cannot be avoided in answering questions at oral
argument").
3. See id. at 52.
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presented after all. Consequently, when I stepped to the podium
for my first moot, I thought I had properly framed the core issue
before the Court in the case and, further, thought I knew why we
should win on that core issue.
As it turns out, however, there is the right way to frame a
legal question in a brief, and the right way to frame the same
legal issue at oral argument, and the two ways of putting are not
necessarily the same, even though it is the same legal issue. The
opening of one's oral argument-and thus its essential theme-
often needs to be much less technical and legalistic than the
question presented in the cert petition or merits-stage brief. In
open court, one must speak to the justices in human terms,
explaining to the justices what the issue-the big deal-is in
easily accessible language, and then explain why one should win
on that point in terms of basic equity or fairness.
Of course, this lay-oriented phrasing of the legal issue
cannot be condescending to the justices, or imprecise, or
otherwise inconsistent with a fully accurate understanding of the
technical legal question. Nor can one's effort to persuade the
justices at the level of basic equity be abstract and theoretical,
untethered from the specific facts of the case. Instead, especially
with the current Court, the narrower and more fact-specific one
makes this equity-based argument, the better. But the key point
here is that, by the time the moots are over and one goes to the
podium for the real thing, one's two-minute opening (especially
as petitioner) must be directly accessible and intuitively
persuasive to the justices, as ordinary human beings, based on
their understanding of the competing interests at stake on the
specific facts of the case.
This process of refinement-taking the essence of the issue
and argument presented in the brief-and distilling it even
further, to get at its most directly accessible and intuitively
appealing formulation, is one that has occurred in each appellate
argument that I've done.4 Each time, I think I've gotten to the
essence of the issue and argument during the brief-writing
process, and each time the process of preparing for oral
argument-and especially the process of successive moots-has
4. Frederick makes the same point. See id. at 243 ("An advocate's understanding of a
case deepens with each increment of significant time spent thinking about it. That is true
even when the attorney has filed a reply brief and is preparing to argue the case." ).
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caused me to achieve a newer, clearer understanding of the issue
and has caused me to express my argument in simpler, more
accessible and intuitively appealing terms.
From a mentoring perspective, it is fortunate that Dave and
Andy were able to witness first-hand the transformation from a
diffuse and stumbling effort in the first moot-where Sutton
quickly exposed the fact that we hadn't yet reduced our
animating principle to a readily accessible and persuasive
point-to a more polished presentation in subsequent moots, and
finally to a "yes, at last we've got it" just in time for the real
event.5 As Dave described it in his account of the experience,
"Ned reached that point [of finally being ready] at around 9:30
Sunday night," with the result that the next morning's argument
seemed like a good day at a bowling alley: "In short, the Court
was setting them up, and Ned was knocking them down."6
IV. A LESSON ABOUT BEING A GENERALIST
Related to this refinement process is the important truth
that one need not be a specialist in any particular area of law to
argue effectively in the Supreme Court. In fact, it helps to be a
generalist (or perhaps an "institutional specialist," with special
expertise on the Court itself), because the justices themselves are
generalists and approach their cases as such.
Consequently, I did not consider it a detriment, but rather
an asset, that I was not an expert in habeas procedure. To be
sure, I had to read large doses of a leading treatise, which I
considered to be my "habeas bible." 7 I was fortunate,
furthermore, that I could call upon lawyers in the Solicitor's
office who were habeas experts. But I knew my function was to
translate an arcane and technical proposition of habeas
5. Here's what we came up with: (1) The state itself wants the opportunity to correct
any constitutional defect in its own court proceedings, so (2) it has provided a specific
mechanism for re-opening proceedings claimed to be defective because of faulty
lawyering, and (3) when a criminal defendant fails to invoke this specific mechanism, the
state is entitled to know why before permitting that defendant to seek redress in a separate
federal proceeding.
6. Patton, supra n. 1, at 38-39.
7. James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure (3d ed., LEXIS Law Pub. 1998).
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procedure into a straightforward, non-technical point that a
generalist judge would easily understand and sympathize with.
As a mentor, moreover, I wanted Dave and Andy to
appreciate the importance of being a good generalist lawyer. I
wanted to instill in them the confidence that, if they are good
generalists, then they never need to feel deficient because they
lack a specific expertise. I wanted them especially to realize that,
in order to communicate "on the same wavelength" as the
justices, its actually better to be a good generalist (or, again, an
institutional specialist), because you can better appreciate where
they are coming from.
I think they got this message when Justice Stevens asked
me a question about the relationship between our case and the
one that was argued first-up that same morning. Luckily, I had
prepared for this kind of question. In fact, I had asked Dave to
track down the briefs in that other case, explaining that it is
important to know what else is on the Court's calendar at the
same time, in order to know what's on the Justices' minds when
they're thinking about your own case. As part of the mentoring
process, I remember telling Dave and Andy that, in general, I
think it is just as important to consider the relationship of one's
case to other cases on the Court's docket at the same time as it is
to know the relationship of one's case to the Court's prior
precedents. But I didn't realize how prescient this piece of
advice would be.
V. A CHANCE TO TEACH WHAT I Now KNow
Since returning to the faculty at Ohio State, I have
endeavored to incorporate into my teaching the lessons learned
from arguing this habeas case. In essence, I try to replicate with
current law students some of the same mentoring that Dave and
Andy received in their on-the-job training.
This year I've been teaching some courses on appellate
advocacy and litigation strategies. At first, I was reluctant to use
my own experience to illustrate effective advocacy techniques.
Instead, drawing heavily on Frederick's fine book, I have used
examples involving well-regarded practitioners before the
Supreme Court bar.
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But lately I've had a change of heart. My students are
unlikely to be repeat players at the highest Court in the land, and
even their trips to the courts of appeal, or to their state supreme
courts, may be fairly limited. There is something to be said for
showing that, with enough preparation and foresight (which
itself comes from thoughtful preparation), they can get it right
the first (and maybe only) time.
Thus, I show my current students the same process of
refinement that Dave and Andy saw first-hand. Having taped my
moots, I show the students these tapes, and they can see me
fumble Sutton's "What's the big deal here?" question in that
first one. With the actual argument tape available on
www.oyez.org, the students can compare the moots with the real
thing. (I thought it would be painful to go back and listen to the
actual argument on tape, but I gritted my teeth and went ahead
for the sake of my students. In fact, however, I was pleasantly
surprised: While I appear, understandably, to be a little nervous
at the very beginning, my opening was substantively strong, and
once I got going, I was focused, on message, and responsive to
the Court's questions.)
Specifically, to illustrate Frederick's crucial point about the
importance of having a mantra that is repeated in different ways
throughout the argument,8 I show the students how, at four
different points in the argument (in the opening, at a lull in the
questioning, right before sitting down the first time, and finally
on rebuttal), I specifically identified the State's interest in the
case in easily understandable terms. To illustrate the equally
important point about the need to answer the Court's questions
directly, I point out that three times my first word in answering a
question from Justice Breyer was a simple "No," followed with
an explanation. In one instance, the explanation came straight
from one of the Court's own prior decisions, and while it was
not a decision that Justice Breyer was comfortable with, my
ability to rely on precedent for this particular point was likely to
satisfy at least five other members of the Court. Pointing the
students to this particular colloquy with Justice Breyer is useful,
therefore, in teaching them two more important principles of
Supreme Court advocacy: First, you need to know when you can
8. Frederick, supra n. 2, at 228-33.
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(and cannot) rely on black-letter law to prevail on a point; and
second, you need to know how to convert a hostile question
from an unsympathetic justice into the opportunity to persuade
enough others to win. 9
Similarly, I am able to show students places in the
argument where I explicitly indicate the narrow grounds upon
which we were seeking to prevail, as well as places where I call
to the Court's attention the possibility that a habeas petitioner
might well prevail on facts different from those in my case.
Affirmatively volunteering these limiting principles, rather than
offering them up while on a hasty retreat under a barrage of
questions, as I tell my students, tends to show the reasonableness
of one's position and simultaneously enhances one's credibility
as an advocate. The result in our case was that, during the other
side's argument, Justice Breyer characterized my answers to his
earlier questions as "not bad" and specifically asked opposing
counsel for a response.'0 While Justice Breyer (and also Justice
Stevens) ultimately rejected our position, his public
acknowledgement of the reasonableness of our view certainly
helped make it easier for other members of the Court (including
Justices Souter and Ginsberg) to see the case our way.
I make these points in class, not to toot my own horn, but to
show students the happy consequences of hard work. In our
case, the hard work was team work, with Dave and Andy
bearing the brunt of it. But, as Dave himself recognized in his
magazine article, that hard work put us in a position to be
effective at the podium: effective in articulating our mantra at
the outset, effective in answering questions, and effective in
returning to our mantra when questioning subsided, in closing,
and on rebuttal. I want all my students to see the same benefits
from hard work: to appreciate the difference between an
unrefined early moot and a polished final product, and to know
that their own first actual appellate argument can undergo this
same refinement process if they put in the necessary thought and
effort.
9. See id. at 243, 255.
10. See 2000 U.S. Trans LEXIS at 31.
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VI. A COMMITMENT TO PREACHING ABOUT PRACTICE
This last observation brings me to a larger point about law
schools and the educational objectives of their curricula. While I
am a believer in a "big tent" philosophy regarding our current
upper-class offerings-from doctrinal survey courses in such
specialties as Environmental Law, Securities Law, and so forth;
to theory courses like Jurisprudence, Feminist Legal Thought,
and the like; to interdisciplinary perspectives like Law and
Economics, Statistics and the Law, and so forth-I now believe
that there is little more valuable than having students understand
and appreciate the difference between knowing a case the way a
good brief-writer does and really knowing a case the way a good
oral advocate does.
If they can see the gap between these two levels of
knowledge, and can know the distance (and effort) it takes to
traverse this gap, then they will have scaled the summit of that
analytic craft we purport to teach: thinking like a lawyer. Having
seen what it takes to reach this apex of insight, they will be
prepared for whatever analytic challenges their practice requires
of them.
I can think of no more important contribution I might make
to the future of this state, now that I have returned to the Ohio
State faculty after serving as State Solicitor, than to share with
my students the insight I obtained as a result of my own on-the-
job training.

